KK Studio is an independent app studio in Switzerland, and it is one person: Kanchalika, KK for short. She builds about 90 apps for iPhone, iPad, Mac and Android, from language courses and the Swiss citizenship test to a baby journal, an app that redacts ID documents and 65 apps for children and families. KK Studio is our sister company. Philippe sat down with her to talk about what worries her in security and where treeinspired can help. The conversation has been shortened and edited.
One studio, one person, ninety apps
Philippe: Who is behind KK Studio?
Kanchalika: Me. I'm a mother and an economist, I used to teach at several universities in Thailand, most recently at Maejo University, I'm self-employed, and I design and build every app myself. Today there are about ninety: language courses, citizenship tests, alphabets in sixty languages, a few tools and a lot for children.
Philippe: Your apps make a point of not collecting anything.
Kanchalika: Private by default. No app asks for an account, the data stays on the device, and in some apps it syncs through the user's own iCloud. I don't run a server with user data. Our family works in security, so I see every day what happens when data leaks. I didn't want to build anything that could leak like that.
The biggest fear is not the data leak
Philippe: So what keeps you up at night?
Kanchalika: Not a leak, I have nothing to leak. What frightens me is someone taking over my Apple or Google developer account. Then they don't just have my account, they have the update channel to every family that installed one of my apps. Most phones update automatically. If a manipulated version of a children's app goes out under my name, that's the worst thing I can imagine.
Philippe: That is exactly the right fear. For a studio without servers, the developer account is the server. And it doesn't even have to be the account: in 2015 attackers distributed a modified version of Xcode, known as XcodeGhost. Developers in China built their apps with it, and infected apps passed Apple's review into the App Store. Nobody had to hack Apple.
KK Studio
What a one-person studio has to protect
- Most valuableThe developer accounts
- Apple and Google Play: the update channel to every user
- Whoever controls them can ship a release to all 90 apps
- Master keyThe mailbox and the domain
- Every password reset ends up in welcome@ and the developer mailbox
- Domain and DNS decide where that mail goes
- The signing keys and the build Mac
- Certificates, upload keys, source code
- A tampered build tool ends up inside every app
- The privacy promise
- No accounts, data stays on the device
- Baby journal with health data, ID documents, 65 kids' apps
Kanchalika: The mailbox surprised me when we wrote this down. I thought of it as the place where feedback arrives.
Philippe: Every password reset for Apple, Google and the domain ends up there. Whoever has the mailbox can reset the rest. And whoever controls the domain's DNS can redirect the mail. That makes the mailbox and the registrar account as important as the developer accounts.
Phishing that looks like App Store Connect
Philippe: What actually lands in your inbox?
Kanchalika: Mails saying my app was rejected, that there is a problem with payments, that I have to verify my developer account by Friday. Some look very real. And through the feedback form I get messages from people who say they found a bug and send a file with “the screenshot”.
Philippe: The rejection mail is the classic one, because it creates exactly the right kind of stress. The rule is simple: you never sign in from a link. You open App Store Connect or the Play Console yourself, and if the rejection is real, it is there. The second part is technical. A fake login page today doesn't just collect the password, it passes the password and the one-time code on to the real site while you type. A code from an app doesn't help against that. Hardware security keys for the Apple Account and passkeys for Google do, because they only answer the real domain.
Kanchalika: And the files from the feedback form?
Philippe: Real users send screenshots as images, not as archives or documents. Anything else you don't open on the Mac you build on.
The scenario KK fears most
From one phishing mail to an update on every device
- “Your app has been rejected”A mail that looks like App Store Connect or the Play Console, with a link to the “review”.What stops it: Never sign in from a link. Open App Store Connect or the Play Console yourself.
- A fake login pageIt forwards the password and the one-time code to the real site as they are typed.What stops it: Passkeys or hardware security keys. They only answer the real domain, so there is nothing to forward.
- The attacker locks the owner outNew recovery address, new phone number, own keys and users added.What stops it: Recovery codes and a second security key offline, and alerts about account changes to an address outside the account.
- A tampered releaseA build with an extra library goes into review like any other update.What stops it: Know which builds you uploaded. An unexpected build in TestFlight or the Play Console is the alarm.
- Automatic updates do the restWithin days the release is on the devices of families who trust the studio.What stops it: A prepared runbook: whom to call at Apple and Google, how to pull a release, what to tell users.
The keys you must not lose
Kanchalika: My second fear is the opposite: not that someone steals something, but that I lose it. A stolen laptop, a broken phone with the two-factor app, and suddenly I can't publish an update for a bug any more.
Philippe: For Android, Play App Signing takes a lot of that worry off you: Google holds the actual signing key, you only have an upload key, and if it is lost or stolen it can be reset through the Play Console. The first thing we check is that every one of your Android apps really uses it. On Apple's side, certificates can be revoked and reissued; what you must not lose is access to the account itself. So: recovery codes on paper, a second security key in a safe place, and both not in the same bag as the laptop.
Kanchalika: And if I'm the one who is unavailable?
Philippe: That is the real weakness of a one-person studio. Not a technical one. We write an emergency sheet: where the recovery material is, who may use it, whom to contact at Apple and Google, how to pull a release. One page, printed, and someone you trust knows where it is.
Health data that never sees a server
Philippe: Mabebe records feeding, sleep, growth, vaccinations and photos. ID-Shield stores ID documents. Does it reassure you that all of that stays on the device?
Kanchalika: For a long time I thought that meant privacy was done.
Philippe: Keeping data local is the best decision you could make. But then the device is the attack surface, and there are things you only see in a test: whether the files are protected while the phone is locked, what ends up in backups, whether the app-switcher snapshot shows an ID document when the app goes into the background, and who sees what in a shared co-parent journal when parents separate. We test Mabebe and ID-Shield along the OWASP MASVS, the standard for exactly these questions.
Kanchalika: Mabebe has optional crash reports, switched off by default.
Philippe: Then we look at what a crash report contains if someone switches them on. Breadcrumbs and log lines sometimes carry more than you think. And we align the wording: if the FAQ says “no personal data”, it should also mention the optional crash reports. Being precise there costs nothing and builds trust. One more thing that applies to a one-person studio too: under Article 24 of the revised Data Protection Act, a breach that is likely to lead to a high risk has to be reported to the FDPIC as soon as possible. It is better to know that before you need it.
The supply chain on your own Mac
Kanchalika: What worries me after XcodeGhost are the libraries. I don't read every line of every package I include.
Philippe: Nobody does. What helps is fewer dependencies, fixed versions, and reading the changes before an update instead of updating everything at once. And keeping the build Mac clean: FileVault on, an encrypted backup, and no keys lying around. We run LeakHound over it first. It finds API keys, tokens and unprotected SSH keys in old project folders, and nothing leaves the Mac.
What we are doing together
Ninety days, in order of risk
- Week 1Lock down the accountsPasskeys or security keys for Apple, Google, the mailbox and the domain registrar. Account-change alerts to a second address.
- Weeks 2–4Keys, recovery, emergency sheetCheck that every Android app uses Play App Signing, store the recovery codes offline, write down who can act if KK cannot.
- Weeks 2–4Clean up the build MacLeakHound for keys and tokens lying around, FileVault, an encrypted backup, dependencies pinned and reviewed.
- Month 2Pentest of Mabebe and ID-ShieldAlong OWASP MASVS: local storage, iCloud sharing, app-switcher snapshots, what crash reports contain.
- Month 3Drill: “the account is gone”Walk through the runbook once, including the notification to the FDPIC and the message to users.
What she would tell other small studios
Philippe: What would you tell someone who builds apps alone?
Kanchalika: That not collecting data is a good start but not the end. Your accounts and your Mac are what attackers want. Protect the developer account as if it were the app, because it is. And write down what happens if you are not there, before you need it.
Building apps on your own? Pentesting and consulting for small studios →